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Abstract We study the problem of advertising a social event in a segmented
market using diﬀerent media. The result of such advertising process is the
evolution of a goodwill vector. We describe the problem as an optimal control
one, assuming that the demand is a concave function of goodwill. We prove
the existence of an optimal solution and characterize it using the Pontryagin
Maximum Principle. This leads to the analysis of a family of linear program-
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ming problems. We provide a more explicit and detailed description of optimal
solutions for the case of goodwill linear demand.
Keywords Marketing · Advertising · Optimal Control
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1 Introduction
In the paper we study a marketing problem formulated as an optimization
model. We focus on a special sort of service, namely a social event, such as a
concert, a workshop, a soccer match, . . . [1] characterize it as being planned
at a fixed time, in a precise place, with a fixed supply capacity, requiring an
advertising campaign in order to stimulate as wide a participation as possible,
admitting the use of diﬀerent media (e.g., TV, radio, Internet, newspapers,
magazines) for advertising. [8] consider a similar context and stress that the
time horizon is short, dissemination of information can be done both through
advertising, controlled by the organizers, and through word-of-mouth. The
latter authors in a diﬀerent paper ([9]) consider marketing strategies for a
one-time entertainment event, which are a combination of advertising and
pricing policies. They distinguish a regular market, with advertising eﬀort and
fixed price, from a last-minute market, with no advertising eﬀort and price
depending on system conditions.
We build a model for a market of a social event which retains only some
of the above mentioned features, disregarding in particular word-of-mouth
communication and price dependence; on the other hand we assume that the
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market incorporates a heterogeneous structure, which may be exploited in the
advertising process. Hence, we formulate the problem considering a segmented
market.
The objective of the event organizers is the profit that has to be maximized.
Production, or capacity cost is taken as constant, and may be disregarded. In
fact, the organizational costs of a concert, a sport meeting, etc. are totally
borne at the event realization date independently of the success of the event
(number of tickets sold for it).
We consider the problem of determining advertising eﬀorts for selling tick-
ets for a social event in a heterogeneous market, which has been segmented.
The relevance of targeting advertising to segments of consumers within a mar-
ket has been the object of study by [7], who stress the fact that targeted
advertising is now specially prominent because of new features of the market-
ing environment. The decision on advertising in a segmented market has been
also studied by [15] and [2,3].
A social event may be considered as a special kind of seasonal product, and
the results presented in this paper complement the analysis done by [5]. In that
paper the eﬀect of advertising on each segment goodwill was represented by a
strictly concave function of the eﬀective advertising eﬀort, and the demand in
each segment was represented by a linear function of segment goodwill. Here,
the eﬀect of advertising on each segment goodwill is represented by a linear
function of advertising eﬀort, and the demand in each segment is represented
by a linear or concave function of segment goodwill. Moreover here we consider
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the possibility of using jointly several advertising media with diﬀerent segment
spectra.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model of
a segmented market, where a product goodwill evolves a` la Nerlove-Arrow,
driven by suitable advertising actions; these are realized by means of diﬀerent
media. In Section 3 we formulate the optimal control problem of advertising a
social event, where demand (for tickets) is a concave function of goodwill. In
Section 4 we prove the existence of an optimal solution and characterize it using
the Pontryagin Maximum Principle. We obtain a more explicit description of
optimal solutions for the case of goodwill linear demand, in Section 5. Finally,
in Section 6 we comment on the results obtained and provide some hints for
possible future developments.
2 Goodwill evolution in a segmented market
We want to consider the optimal control problem of determining advertis-
ing eﬀorts for maximizing the profit from a social (entertainment) event in a
heterogeneous market.
In order to address such a kind of market it is important to segment it. As
Easey says, “Market segmentation is where the larger market is heterogeneous
and can be broken down into smaller units that are similar in character.” [4,
p. 253]. Other authors observe that “... a range of media ... are used that
are said to be targeted specifically at certain segments of the market” ([16]).
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While discussing the success of segmentation of particular media, the same
authors stress that media “... play a vital role in the success of targeting
eﬀorts.” Typical segmentations are obtained using such attributes as region,
age, gender, occupation, generation, lifestyle, occasions, ... [12, p. 288].
Let the consumer (or potential attendees) population be partitioned into
n groups (segments), each one specified by the value i ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} of a
suitable parameter (segmentation attribute). Let Gi (t) represent the stock of
goodwill of the service/product at time t, for the consumers in the ith segment.
We refer to the definition of goodwill given by [13] to describe the variable
which summarizes the eﬀects of present and past advertising on the demand.
The goodwill needs an advertising eﬀort to increase, while it is subject to a
spontaneous decay. Here we assume that the goodwill evolution satisfies the
set of independent ordinary diﬀerential equations
G˙i (t) = wi (t)− δiGi (t) , i = 1, . . . n , (1)
where δi > 0 represents the goodwill depreciation rate for the members of
the consumer group i and wi (t) is the eﬀective advertising intensity at time
t directed to that same group. For each fixed value of the parameter i ∈
{1, . . . n}, i.e. for each segment, the dynamics of the goodwill given by (1) is
the same as the one proposed in [13]. Here, consistently with the assumption
of distinct goodwill variables for diﬀerent market segments, we further assume
that both the advertising intensity and the goodwill decay parameter may
depend on the attribute value i.
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In the following we will write the motion equations (1) in vector notation:
G˙ (t) = −diag (δ)G (t) +w (t) , (2)
where diag (δ) is the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries the elements of
δ = (δ1, . . . δn).
We consider an event organizer who bears the organizational costs of the
event (a concert, a sport meeting, etc. ) in the time interval [0, T ], T > 0, and
will observe the success of the event (number of tickets sold for it) at the final
time T .
The value of the goodwill vector at the initial time 0 is a known datum,
G (0) = G0 ≥ 0 , (3)
where the possible positivity of some components is explained as residual good-
will from past experience with the same event organizer.
The targeting eﬀort in a segmented market, at a given time t, is represented
by the direction of the advertising eﬀort vector w (t), i.e. by ￿w (t) ￿−1w (t).
In order to choose a specific target, or advertising eﬀort direction, the event
organizer wants to use a range of media with specific segment targets ([16]).
We assume that the organizer may use m ≥ 2 advertising media which
reach diﬀerent segments with variable eﬀectiveness. Let u (t) ∈ [0,+∞)m be
the m-dimensional advertising eﬀort: its jth component uj(t) is the medium
j advertising eﬀort, and we assume that the consequent eﬀective advertising
intensity at time t ∈ [0, T ] directed to segment i is
wji (t) = γijuj(t) , i = 1, . . . n , j = 1, . . . m , (4)
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for some medium and segment specific parameters γij ≥ 0, such that
￿n
i=1 γij >
0. We assume that the total eﬀective advertising intensity at time t directed
to segment i is wi(t) =
￿m
j=1 γijuj(t) , i = 1, . . . n , so that, in vector notation,
we have
w (t) = Γu (t) , (5)
where Γ = (γij) ∈ Mn×m (R). We call medium j segment-spectrum the jth
column γ·j of matrix Γ . Equation (5) represents the additive advertising eﬀects
assumption, which is a standard one (see e.g. [10, p. 108], [6], [11]).
3 Advertising a social event
We want to determine the optimal advertising policy in the time interval [0, T ],
in order to maximize the net profit. As the typical advertising period for such
events is short (see [8]), we consider undiscounted costs and revenue.
The demand rate in each segment i and time t depends on the goodwill
Gi (t), through a demand function fi(·), so that the cumulative demand at
time t, x(t), is the solution to the Cauchy problem
x˙ (t) =
n￿
i=1
fi (Gi (t)) , x (0) = 0 . (6)
where fi(·) is a nonnegative, increasing and concave function, with fi(0) = 0.
Its value depends on the dimension of the segment, i.e. number of potential
attendees in it, and on the interest of those potential attendees to the event, as
represented by the goodwill Gi. We further assume that it is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, with f ￿i(·) > 0 and f ￿￿i (·) ≤ 0.
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The goodwill evolution is driven by the advertising eﬀorts (the control
functions) ui(t) ≥ 0 with constant marginal costs ki > 0. We define the row
vector k = (k1, k2, . . . km) ∈ Rm, so that the total advertising cost rate at time
t is the scalar product ku (t).
Let the profit, gross of advertising costs be represented by R(x), where x is
the event participation or number of tickets sold, and the constant production
cost is disregadred. We assume that R(·) is a nonnegative, increasing and
strictly concave function, with R(0) = 0; we further assume that it is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, with R￿(·) > 0 and R￿￿(·) < 0. The advertising
problem of maximizing the overall profit
J (u) = R (x (T ))−
￿ T
0
ku (t) dt (7)
subject to the conditions (2), (5), (6), (3), and the control constraints
ku (t) ≤ b , (8)
0 ≤ u(t) ≤ u¯ , (9)
for some u¯, with u¯j > 0, j = 1, . . . m, and b > 0, is an optimal control problem.
The upper bound b on the global advertising cost rate ku (t) represents an a
priori decision of the event organizer; the same reason, and also technological
or contractual reasons justify the upper bounds u¯j on the medium j activation
level, for all j.
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4 Optimal solution
The Hamiltonian function associated with the advertising problem is
H (G, x,u,p, q) = −ku+ p (Γu− diag (δ)G) + q
n￿
i=1
fi (Gi) , (10)
where the row vector p ∈ Rn and q ∈ R are the adjoint variables associated
withG and x. We observe that the Hamiltonian is a linear function of (G, x,u).
Using the Pontryagin Maximum Principle (see e.g. [14, p. 182]) we obtain
that, if (u∗(t),G∗(t), x∗(t)) is an optimal solution to the advertising problem,
then, for all t ∈ [0, T ], u∗(t) is an optimal solution to the linear programming
problem
maximize (p(t)Γ − k)u,
subject to ku ≤ b ,
u ≤ u¯ ,
u ≥ 0 ;
(11)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . n, the ith component of the n-dimensional adjoint function
p(t) satisfies the linear diﬀerential equation
p˙i (t) = δipi (t)− q(t)f ￿i(Gi(t)) , (12)
and the transversality condition
pi (T ) = 0 ; (13)
whereas the adjoint function q(t) is constant and has the value
q(t) = q = R￿(x(T )) > 0 . (14)
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An implicit solution to equation (12) satisfying (13), i.e. with pi (1) = 0, is
pi (t) = q
￿ T
t
e−δi(s−t)f ￿i(Gi(s))ds . (15)
The feasible region of the linear programming problem (11) is invariant
with respect to time t and it is non-empty and bounded, hence, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
the problem (11) has an optimal solution at some vertex of its feasible region.
If there exists a solution to the necessary PMP conditions of the advertising
problem, then we can state that it is optimal, using the Mangasarian suﬃciency
theorem (see e.g. [14, p. 182]), because the Hamiltonian (10) is concave in
(G, x,u), and R(x) is concave in x.
On the other hand, we can state that the advertising problem has an opti-
mal solution, as the assumptions of the existence theorem of Filippov–Cesari
[14, p. 132] are satisfied:
– the control u(t) ≡ 0 induces an admissible solution;
– the range of the control function is the convex polyhedron
U = {u | ku ≤ b , u ≤ u¯ , u ≥ 0},
a closed and bounded set;
– the objective functional can be written, in Lagrange form, as
J =
￿ T
0
￿
R￿(x(t))
n￿
i=1
fi (Gi(t))− ku(t)
￿
dt
and therefore the set￿￿
R￿(x)
n￿
i=1
fi (Gi)− ku+ ξ, Γu− diag (δ)G,
n￿
i=1
fi (Gi)
￿
, ξ ≤ 0, u ∈ U
￿
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is convex for each (x,G, t), as it is an aﬃne transformation of the (m+1)-
dimensional convex set (−∞, 0]× U ;
– for all admissible control-state functions (u(t),G(t), x(t)),
￿(G(t), x(t))￿ ≤
￿￿￿￿
￿
G0 + TΓ u¯,
n￿
i=1
fi
￿
G0i + Tγi·u¯
￿￿￿￿￿￿,
where γi· is the ith row of the matrix Γ .
An elementary observation on the problem (11) reveals for an optimal
solution u∗ that
(p(t)Γ − k)j = p(t)γ·j − kj < 0 ⇒ u∗j = 0 , (16)
or that
u∗j > 0 ⇒ p(t)γ·j − kj ≥ 0 . (17)
The adjoint functions pj(t) are continuous, with pj(T ) = 0, hence the
coeﬃcients of the objective function of the problem (11), i.e. p(t)γ·j − kj ,
j = 1, 2, . . . m, are continuous functions of t, and they are negative in a neigh-
borhood of the final time T , because
p(T )γ·j − kj = −kj < 0 . (18)
As a consequence, any optimal advertising policy u∗(t) must be 0 in a neigh-
borhood of the final time.
At any given time t < T , the optimal solutions to problem (11) are all the
points in the convex hull of the optimal vertices of the feasible region.
As a general comment on the linear programming problem constraints, we
single out four distinct situations that may occur:
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i) if b < minj kj u¯j , then all the medium activation level constraints are re-
dundant, as they result inactive at all feasible points, and the only relevant
constraint is that concerning the global advertising cost rate;
ii) if minj kj u¯j ≤ b < maxj kj u¯j , then several medium activation level con-
straints are relevant, together with the global advertising cost rate con-
straint;
iii) if maxj kj u¯j ≤ b ≤ ku¯, then all the constraints stated in (11) are relevant;
iv) if b > ku¯, then the global advertising cost rate constraint is redundant, and
all the constraints concerning the medium activation levels are relevant.
In the extreme situations i) and iv) the feasible region of the problem (11)
has particular simple structures and some features of optimal solutions emerge
easily.
Although the present analysis has been developed assuming m ≥ 2, when
“several media” makes sense, everything holds also in the degenerate case
that m = 1 and one wants to determine the optinal advertising eﬀort using
a single medium. In such a case an optimal control is of the bang-bang type,
with values in {0, min {u¯, b/k}}, where k and u¯ are the marginal cost and the
maximum admissible activation level of the unique advertising medium.
4.1 Constraint on global advertising cost rate only
Let b < minj kj u¯j , so that we can ignore all the medium activation level
constraints, which are redundant, and the only relevant constraint is that
concerning the global advertising cost rate.
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The feasible region of the linear programming problem (11), under the
present assumption, is characterized by the inequalities
ku ≤ b , u ≥ 0 ; (19)
it is the m-dimensional convex polyhedron with the m+ 1 vertices
0, and u(j) =
b
kj
ej , j = 1, 2, . . . m, (20)
where ej is the jth vector of the canonical basis of Rm.
The control u∗(t) = 0 is the optimal solution to problem (11) at time t if
and only if p(t)Γ − k ≤ 0. Otherwise, the value of the objective function of
the problem (11) at the vertex u(j) is
p(t)γ·j − b , (21)
and then the control u(j
∗) is an optimal solution to problem (11) at time t if
and only if
j∗ ∈ argmax
j
p(t)γ·j . (22)
We have obtained that an optimal solution requires that at any time t either
the event organizer does not advertise, or he advertises using only media which
solve the choice condition (22); if only one medium is used, say the jth, then
this is done at level b/kj (i.e. uj = b/kj).
Remark: The equation (22) provides the formulation of a medium choice prob-
lem, but it is not directly useful, because in order to make it explicit we need
to know the optimal state function (G∗(t), x∗(t)), as equations (15) and (14)
witness.
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4.2 Constraints on medium activation levels only
Let b > ku¯, so that we can ignore the global advertising cost rate constraint
which is redundant.
The feasible region is the m-dimensional interval
￿m
j=1[0, u¯j ] with the 2
m
vertices ￿
j∈Σ
u¯jej , Σ ⊆ {1, 2, . . . m}. (23)
At an optimal solution u∗(t) to problem (11), and at any time t ∈ [0, T ],
the constraint uj ≤ u¯j must be active if p(t)γ·j − kj > 0 , and inactive if
p(t)γ·j − kj < 0 ; in the first case u∗j (t) = u¯j , whereas in the latter u∗j (t) = 0.
In other terms, an optimal solution to problem (11), at any time t ∈ [0, T ], is
u∗(t) =
￿
j∈Σ(t)
u¯jej , Σ(t) =
￿
j | p(t)γ·j − kj > 0
￿
. (24)
Remark: The equation (24) provides the formulation of a medium subset choice
problem, and a similar observation as in the case of equation (22) applies here.
5 Linear demand
Let us consider the special choice of linear demand functions,
fi(Gi) = βiGi , i = 1, 2, . . . n , (25)
where the parameter βi > 0 is the marginal demand of goodwill in segment
i and we define the row vector β = (β1,β2, . . . βn). Then, the cumulative
demand at time t, x(t), is the solution to the Cauchy problem
x˙ (t) = βG (t) , x (0) = 0 . (26)
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Under this assumption, the last term in the r.h.s. of the Hamiltonian defi-
nition (10) becomes
q
n￿
i=1
fi (Gi) = βG .
The PMP conditions presented in Section 4 hold and, in particular, the n-
dimensional adjoint function p(t) has the ith component satisfying the equa-
tion (12), and hence p(t) must satisfy now the following linear diﬀerential
equation with constant coeﬃcients
p˙ (t) = p (t) diag (δ)− qβ . (27)
We observe from the equations (27), (13), (14) that the behaviour of the ad-
joint funcions pi(t) and the distinction among them depend only on segment
specific features, and are independent of medium specific features. The Cauchy
problem (27) and (13) has the explicit solution p(t) with positive and mono-
tonically decreasing components
pi (t) =
qβi
δi
￿
1− eδi(t−T )
￿
, i = 1, 2, . . . n. (28)
Let us define the functions
ϕj(t) =
1
q
p(t)γ·j =
n￿
i=1
γij
βi
δi
￿
1− eδi(t−T )
￿
, j = 1, 2, . . . m, (29)
which are positive, continuous and monotonically decreasing, with ϕj(T ) = 0.
The coeﬃcients of the objective function of the problem (11), i.e.
(p(t)Γ − k)j = qϕj(t)− kj , j = 1, 2, . . . m, (30)
are decreasing and continuous functions of t, moreover they are negative in
a neighborhood of the final time T , as already known in the general case,
because qϕj(T )− kj = −kj < 0 .
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5.1 Constraint on global advertising cost rate only - linear demand
Let b < minj kj u¯j , so that the medium activation level constraints are redun-
dant. As p(t)γ·j = qϕj(t), the medium choice problem (22) can now be stated
as
j∗ ∈ argmax
j
ϕj(t) . (31)
This is now an explicit formulation, as its solution depends exclusively on the
control problem parameters, in contrast with what occurs in the nonlinear de-
mand context, where the knowledge of the optimal state function (G∗(t), x∗(t))
is required.
In the special case that δi = δ for all i, if there exists an optimal control
which is not always equal to zero, then some optimal control is a vertex ( ￿= 0)
of the feasible region of problem (11) and hence it is characterised by
u∗(t; q) =

(b/kj∗)ej∗ , t ∈ [ 0, τj∗(q)] ,
0, t ∈ (τj∗(q), T ] ,
(32)
where
τj∗(q) = ϕ
−1
j∗ (kj∗/q) , (33)
and
j∗ = argmax
j
βγ·j . (34)
We can obtain an optimal solution to the advertising (control) problem by
finding q such that the condition (14), q = R￿(x∗(T )), holds true with the
state trajectories (G∗(t), x∗(t)) determined by the control u∗(t; q).
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It is remarkable the fact that in this case the medium j choice does not
depend on time t.
5.2 Constraints on medium activation levels only - linear demand
Let b > ku¯, so that the global advertising cost rate constraint is redundant.
In view of the analysis of Section 4.2, an optimal solution u∗(t; q) to problem
(11), at all times t ∈ [0, T ], is characterized by
u∗(t; q) =

u¯j , t ∈ [0, τj(q)] ,
0, t ∈ (τj(q), T ] ,
(35)
where
τj(q) =

ϕ−1j (kj/q), if ϕj(0) > kj/q ,
0, if ϕj(0) ≤ kj/q .
(36)
Finally, we can obtain an optimal solution to the advertising (control)
problem by finding q such that the condition (14), q = R￿(x∗(T )), holds true
with (G∗(t), x∗(t)) determined by the control u∗(t; q).
The total eﬀective advertising intensity directed to any market segment is
a monotonically decreasing, stepwise function, with the value 0 in a neighbor-
hood of the final time T . This qualitative result is in agreement with those
obtained in [5], for seasonal products. The feature that the advertising eﬀorts
are decreasing is shared also by the results obtained in [8], although there the
main motivation is the word-of-mouth communication process coupling the
advertising one.
18 Daniela Favaretto et al.
The optimal control has a special bang-bang structure, characterized by
them switch times τj , j = 1, . . . m; these are advertising stopping times which
we call advertising exposures. Let us denote by x∗ the number of sold tickets
x(T ) associated with the optimal solution. Then, in view of the equations (14)
and (28), the characterization of the optimal advertising exposures is, for all
j = 1, . . . m:
τ∗j =

ϕ−1j (kj/R
￿ (x∗)), if ϕj(0) > kj/R￿ (x∗) ,
0, if ϕj(0) ≤ kj/R￿ (x∗) .
(37)
We can make the information on the optimal solution more explicit in terms
of exposures by integrating the motion equations. LetG (t; τ ) = G (t; τ1, ..., τm)
be the unique solution to the motion equation (2) with
w (t) = Γu∗(t; q) =
m￿
j=1
γ·ju
∗
j (t; q) , (38)
with switch times τj(q) as defined by equation (36); we have that
G (t; τ ) = e−diag(δ)tG0 +
m￿
j=1
u¯je
−diag(δ)t
￿ min{τj ,t}
0
ediag(δ)(s)γ·jds . (39)
After integrating the motion equation (6), we obtain that the number of tickets
sold in the interval [0, T ] is
x (T ; τ ) = x (T ;0) +
n￿
i=1
βi
δ2i
m￿
j=1
u¯jγij
￿
δiτj + e
−δiT − eδi(τj−T )
￿
, (40)
where
x (T ;0) =
n￿
i=1
βiG0i
δi
￿
1− e−δiT ￿ (41)
is the number of tickets the organizer can sell without any advertising eﬀort.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the problem of advertising a social event in a
segmented market using diﬀerent media. Assuming additive advertising eﬀects
on goodwill evolution, and goodwill concave demand rate, we have formulated
the optimal control problem of maximizing the profit from the sale of tickets
for the entertainment event. We have observed that the Pontryagin Maximum
Principle conditions involve the discussion of a family of linear programming
problems, with time-varying objective functions. This is the framework for the
discussion of existence of an optimal solution and for its characterization.
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